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Hockey Teams and Risk Reduction or What Makes Roberto Luongo = PPE

Canucks Hockey Flag
This entry is part 1 of 3 in the series Hierarchy of Controls

Special Co-​​Author, Tom Doyle  (tjdotdoyleatindus­tri­al­safe­ty­in­te­gra­tiondotcom)  

Last week we saw the Boston Bruins earn the Stanley Cup. I was root­ing for the green, blue and white, and the ruin of my voice on Thursday was ample evi­dence that no amount of cheer­ing helped. While I was watch­ing the game with friends and col­leagues, I real­ized that Roberto Luongo and Tim Thomas were their respec­tive team’s PPE*. Sound odd? Let me explain.

Risk Assessment and the Hierarchy of Controls

Equipment design­ers need to under­stand  OHS* risk. The only proven method for under­stand­ing risk is risk assess­ment. Once that is done, the next play in the game is the reduc­tion of risks by elim­i­nat­ing haz­ards wher­ever pos­si­ble and con­trol­ling those that remain.

Control comes in a cou­ple of flavours:

  • Hazard mod­i­fi­ca­tion to reduce the sever­ity of injury, or
  • prob­a­bil­ity mod­i­fi­ca­tion to reduce the prob­a­bil­ity of a worker com­ing together with the haz­ard.

These ideas have been for­mal­ized in the Hierarchy of Controls. Briefly, the Hierarchy starts with haz­ard elim­i­na­tion or sub­sti­tu­tion, and flows down through engi­neer­ing con­trols, infor­ma­tion for use, admin­is­tra­tive con­trols and finally PPE. As you move down through the Hierarchy, the effec­tive­ness and the reli­a­bil­ity of the mea­sures declines.

It’s impor­tant to rec­og­nize that we haven’t done a risk assess­ment in writ­ing this post. This step was skipped for the pur­pose of this example—to apply the hier­ar­chy cor­rectly, you MUST start with a risk assess­ment!

So how does this relate to Hockey?

Hockey and the Hierarchy of Controls

Hazard Identification and Exposure to Risk

If we con­sider the goal as the worker — the thing we don’t want “injured”, the puck is the haz­ard, and the act of scor­ing a goal as the act of injur­ing a per­son, then the rest quickly becomes clear.

Level 1: Hazard Elimination

By def­i­n­i­tion, if we elim­i­nate the puck, we no longer have a game. We just have a bunch of big guys skat­ing around in cool jer­seys with sticks, maybe hav­ing a fight or two, because they’re bored or just don’t know what else to do. Since we want to have a game, either to play or to watch, we have to allow the risk of injury to exist. We could call this the “intrin­sic risk”, as it is the risk that exists before we add any controls.

Level 2: Hazard Substitution

The Center and the Wingers (col­lec­tively the “Forwards” or the “Offensive Line”), act as haz­ard “sub­sti­tu­tion”. We’ve already estab­lished that elim­i­na­tion of the haz­ard results in the loss of the intended function—no puck, no game. The for­wards only let the other team have the puck on rare occa­sion, if they’re play­ing well. This is a great idea, but still a lit­tle too opti­mistic after all. Both teams are try­ing to get the puck in the oppos­ing net and both teams have qual­i­fied to play the final game. If they fail to keep the puck beyond the other team’s blue line, or at least beyond the cen­ter line, then the next layer of pro­tec­tion kicks in, with the Defensive Line.

Level 3: Engineering Controls

As the puck moves down the ice, the Defensive Line engages the approach­ing puck, attempt­ing to block access to the area closer to the goal. They act as a mov­able bar­rier between the net and the puck.  They will do what­ever is nec­es­sary to keep the haz­ard from com­ing in con­tact with the net. As engi­neer­ing con­trols, their coör­di­na­tion and posi­tion­ing are crit­i­cal in ensur­ing success.

The sys­tem will fail if the con­trols have poor:

  • posi­tion­ing,
  • choice of mate­ri­als (players),
  • tim­ing, etc.

These risk con­trols fail reg­u­larly, so are less desir­able than hav­ing the Forward Line han­dle Risk Control.

Level 4: Information for Use and Awareness Means

In a hockey game, the infor­ma­tion for use is the rule book. This infor­ma­tion tells play­ers, coaches, and offi­cials how the game is to be played, and what the intended use of the game should be. Activities like spear­ing, trip­ping, and blind-​​side checks are not permitted.

The aware­ness means are pro­vided by the roar of the fans. As the puck heads for the home-team’s goal, the home fans will roar, let­ting the team know, if they don’t know already, that the goal is at risk from the puck. Hopefully the defen­sive line can react in time and get between the puck and the net.

Level 5: Administrative Controls

Information for use from the pre­vi­ous step is the basis for all the fol­low­ing con­trols. The team’s coaches, or “super­vi­sors”, use this infor­ma­tion to give train­ing in the form of hockey prac­tice. The Forward Line and Defensive Line could be con­sid­ered the Suppliers and Users. They all need to know what to do to avoid haz­ardous sit­u­a­tions, and what to do when one arises, to reduce the num­ber of poten­tial failures.

A “Permit to Work” is given to the play­ers by the coach when they form the lines. The coach ensures that the right peo­ple are on the ice for each set of cir­cum­stances, decid­ing when line changes hap­pen as the game pro­gresses, adapt­ing the peo­ple per­mit­ted to work to the spe­cific con­di­tions on the ice.

Level 6: Personal Protective Equipment (PPE)

All of this brings me to Roberto Luongo and Tim Thomas. So how is a Goalie like PPE?

Goalies are the “last-​​ditch” pro­tec­tion. It’s clear that the first 5 lev­els of the hier­ar­chy don’t always work, since every type of con­trol, even haz­ard elim­i­na­tion, has fail­ure modes. To give a bit of backup, we should make sure that we add extra pro­tec­tion in the form of PPE.

The puck wasn’t elim­i­nated, since hav­ing a hockey game is the point, after all. The puck wasn’t kept dis­tant by the Forward Line. The Defensive Line failed to main­tain safe dis­tance between the goal and the puck, and now all that is left is the goalie (or your pro­tec­tive eye­wear, boots, hard­hat, or what­ever). In the 2011 Stanley Cup Final game, Luongo equaled long pants and long sleeves, while Thomas equaled a suit of armour. The Bruin’s “PPE” afforded supe­rior pro­tec­tion in this case.

As any­one who has used pro­tec­tive eye­wear knows, par­ti­cles can get by your eye­wear. There are lots of fac­tors, includ­ing how well they fit, if you’re wear­ing them (prop­erly or at all!), etc. If the gear is fit­ted and used prop­erly by a per­son who under­stands WHY and HOW to use the equip­ment, then the PPE is more like Tim Thomas, and you may be able to “shut out” injury. Most of the time. Remember that even Tim Thomas misses stop­ping some shots on goal and the other guys can still score.

When your PPE doesn’t fit prop­erly, isn’t selected prop­erly, is worn out (or psy­ched out as the case may be), or isn’t used prop­erly, then it’s more like Roberto Luongo. Sometimes it works per­fectly, and life is good. Sometimes it fails com­pletely and you end up injured or worse.

Goalies are also like PPE because they are RIGHT THERE. Right before injury will occur. PPE is RIGHT THERE, pro­tect­ing you—5 mm from the sur­face of your eye, or in your ear, 2 mm from your ear drum. By this point the harm­ful energy is RIGHT THERE, ready to hurt you, and injury is immi­nent. A sim­ple mis­place­ment or bad fit con­di­tion and you’re blinded or deaf or… well you get the idea!

On Wednesday night, 15-​​Jun-​​2011, every­thing failed for the Vancouver Canucks. The team’s spirit was down, and they went into the game think­ing “We just don’t want to lose!” instead of Boston’s “We’re tak­ing that Cup home!”. Even the touted Home Ice Advantage wasn’t enough to psych out the Bruins, and in the end I think it turned on the Canucks as the fans real­ized that the game was lost. The warn­ings failed, the guards failed, and the PPE failed. Somebody got hurt, and unfor­tu­nately for Canadian fans, it was the Canucks. Luckily it wasn’t a fatal­ity! Even being #2 in the NHL is a long stretch bet­ter than fill­ing a cooler drawer in the morgue.

So the next time you’re set­ting up a job, an assem­bly line, a new machine, or a new work­place, check out your team and make sure that you’ve got the right play­ers on the ice. You only get one chance to get it right. Sure, you can change the lines and upgrade when you need to, but once some­one scores a goal, you have an injured per­son and big­ger prob­lems to deal with.

Special thanks to Tom Doyle for his con­tri­bu­tions to this post!

*Personal Protective EquipmentOccupational Health and Safety

The Problem with Probability

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This entry is part 3 of 7 in the series Risk Assessment

Risk Factors

Severity

There are two key fac­tors that need to be under­stood when assess­ing risk: Severity and Probability (or Likelihood).

Severity seems to be fairly well understood—most peo­ple can fairly eas­ily imag­ine what reach­ing into a spin­ning blade might do to the hand doing the reach­ing. There is a prob­lem that arises when there is an insuf­fi­cient under­stand­ing of the haz­ard, but that’s the sub­ject for another post.

Probability

Probability or like­li­hood is used to describe the chance that an injury or a haz­ardous sit­u­a­tion will occur. Probability is used when numeric data is avail­able and prob­a­bil­ity can be cal­cu­lated, while like­li­hood is used when the assess­ment is sub­jec­tive. The prob­a­bil­ity fac­tor is often bro­ken down fur­ther into three sub-​​factors as seen in Figure 3 below [1]:

There is No Reality, only Perception…

Whether you use prob­a­bil­ity or like­li­hood in your assess­ment, there is a fun­da­men­tal prob­lem with people’s per­cep­tion of these fac­tors. People have a dif­fi­cult time appre­ci­at­ing the mean­ing of prob­a­bil­ity. Probability is a key fac­tor in deter­min­ing the degree of risk from any haz­ard, yet when fig­ures like “1 in 1000″ or “1 x 10–5 occur­rences per year” are dis­cussed, it’s hard for peo­ple to truly grasp what these num­bers mean. When prob­a­bil­ity is dis­cussed as a rate, a fig­ure like “1 x 10–5 occur­rences per year” can make the chance of an occur­rence seem incon­ceiv­ably dis­tant, and there­fore less of a con­cern. Likewise, when more sub­jec­tive scales are used it can be dif­fi­cult to really under­stand what “likely” or “rarely” actu­ally mean. Consequently, even in cases where the sever­ity may be very high, the risk related to a par­tic­u­lar haz­ard may be neglected if the prob­a­bil­ity is deemed low.

To see the other side, con­sider people’s atti­tude when it comes to win­ning a lot­tery. Most peo­ple will agree that “Someone will win” and the infin­i­tes­i­mal prob­a­bil­ity of win­ning is seen as sig­nif­i­cant.  The same odds given in rela­tion­ship to a neg­a­tive risk might be seen as ‘infin­i­tes­i­mally small’, and there­fore negligible.

For exam­ple, con­sider the deci­sions made by the Tokyo Electric Power Corporation (TEPCO) when they con­structed the Fukushima Dai Ichi nuclear power plant. TEPCO engi­neers and sci­en­tists assessed the site in the 1960’s and decided that a 10 meter tsunami was a real­is­tic pos­si­bil­ity at the site. They decided to build the reac­tors, tur­bines and backup gen­er­a­tors 10 meters above the sur­round­ing sea level, then located the sys­tem crit­i­cal con­densers in the sea­ward yard of the plant at a level below 10 meters. To pro­tect that crit­i­cal equip­ment they built a 5.7 meter high sea­wall, almost 50% shorter than the pre­dicted height for a tsunami! While I don’t know what ratio­nale they used to sup­port this design deci­sion, it is clear that the plant would have taken sig­nif­i­cant dam­age from even a rel­a­tively mild tsunami. The 11-​​Mar-​​11 tsunami topped the high­est pre­dic­tion by nearly 5 meters, result­ing in a Level 7 nuclear acci­dent and decades for recov­ery. TEPCO exec­u­tives have repeat­edly stated that the con­di­tions lead­ing to the acci­dent were “incon­ceiv­able”, and yet redun­dancy was built into the sys­tems for just this type of event, and some plan­ning for tsunami effects were put into the design. Clearly was nei­ther unimag­in­able or incon­ceiv­able, just underestimated.

Risk Perception

So why is it that tiny odds are seen as an accept­able risk and even a rea­son­able like­li­hood in one case, and a neg­li­gi­ble chance in the other, par­tic­u­larly when the ignored case is the one that will have a sig­nif­i­cant neg­a­tive outcome?
According to an arti­cle in Wikipedia [2], there are three main schools of thought when it comes to under­stand­ing risk per­cep­tion: psy­cho­log­i­cal, soci­o­log­i­cal and inter­dis­ci­pli­nary. In a key early paper writ­ten in 1969 by Chauncy Starr [3], it was dis­cov­ered that peo­ple would accept vol­un­tary risks 1000 times greater than invol­un­tary risks. Later research has chal­lenged these find­ings, show­ing the gap between vol­un­tary and invol­un­tary to be much nar­rower than Starr found.
Early psy­cho­me­t­ric research by Kahneman and Tversky, showed that peo­ple use a num­ber of heuris­tics to eval­u­ate infor­ma­tion. These heuris­tics included:
  • Representativeness;
  • Availability;
  • Anchoring and Adjustment;
  • Asymmetry; and
  • Threshold effects.
This research showed that peo­ple tend to be averse to risks to gains, like the poten­tial for loss of sav­ings by mak­ing risky invest­ments, while they tend to accept risk eas­ily when it comes to poten­tial losses, pre­fer­ring the hope of los­ing noth­ing over a cer­tain but smaller loss. This may explain why low-​​probability, high sever­ity OHS risks are more often ignored, in the hope that lesser injuries will occur rather than the max­i­mum pre­dicted severity.

Significant results also show that bet­ter infor­ma­tion fre­quently has no effect on how risks are judged. More weight is put on risks with imme­di­ate, per­sonal results than those seen in longer time frames. Psychometric research has shown that risk per­cep­tion is highly depen­dent on intu­ition, expe­ri­en­tial think­ing, and emo­tions. The research iden­ti­fied char­ac­ter­is­tics that may be con­densed into three high order factors:

  1. the degree to which a risk is understood;
  2. the degree to which it evokes a feel­ing of dread; and
  3. the num­ber of peo­ple exposed to the risk.

Dread” describes a risk that elic­its vis­ceral feel­ings of impend­ing cat­a­stro­phe, ter­ror and loss of con­trol. The more a per­son dreads an activ­ity, the higher its per­ceived risk and the more that per­son wants the risk reduced [4]. Fear is clearly a stronger moti­va­tor than any degree of information.

Considering the dif­fer­ing views of those study­ing risk per­cep­tion, it’s no won­der that this is a chal­leng­ing sub­ject for safety practitioners!

Estimating Probability

Frequency and Duration

Some aspects of prob­a­bil­ity are not too dif­fi­cult to esti­mate. Consider the Frequency or Duration of Exposure fac­tor. At face value this can be stated as “X cycles per hour” or “Y hours per week”. Depending on the haz­ard, there may be more com­plex expo­sure data, like that used when con­sid­er­ing audi­ble noise expo­sure. In that case, noise is often expressed as a time-​​weighted-​​average (TWH), like “83 dB(A), 8 h TWH”, mean­ing 83 dB(A) aver­aged over 8 hours.

Estimating the prob­a­bil­ity of a haz­ardous sit­u­a­tion is usu­ally not too tough either. This could be expressed as “15 min­utes, once per day /​ shift” or “2 days, twice per year”.

Avoidance

Estimating the prob­a­bil­ity of avoid­ing an injury in any given haz­ardous sit­u­a­tion is MUCH more dif­fi­cult, since the speed of occur­rence, the abil­ity to per­ceive the haz­ard, the knowl­edge of the exposed per­son, their abil­ity to react in the sit­u­a­tion, the level of train­ing that they have, the pres­ence of com­ple­men­tary pro­tec­tive mea­sures, and many other fac­tors come into play. Depth of under­stand­ing of the haz­ard and the details of the haz­ardous sit­u­a­tion by the risk asses­sors is crit­i­cal to a sound assess­ment of the risk involved.

The Challenge

The chal­lenge for safety prac­ti­tion­ers is twofold:

  1. As prac­ti­tion­ers, we must try to over­come our biases when con­duct­ing risk assess­ment work, and where we can­not over­come those biases, we must at least acknowl­edge them and the effects they may pro­duce in our work; and
  2. We must try to present the risks in terms that the exposed peo­ple can under­stand, so that they can make a rea­soned choice for their own per­sonal safety.

I don’t sug­gest that this is easy, nor do I advo­cate “dumb­ing down” the infor­ma­tion! I do believe that risk infor­ma­tion can be pre­sented to non-​​technical peo­ple in ways that they can under­stand the crit­i­cal points.

Risk assess­ment tech­niques are becom­ing fun­da­men­tal in all areas of design. As safety prac­ti­tion­ers, we must be ready to con­duct risk assess­ments using sound tech­niques, be aware of our biases and be patient in com­mu­ni­cat­ing the results of our analy­sis to every­one that may be affected.

References

[1] “Safety of Machinery—General Principles for Design—Risk Assessment and Risk Reduction”, ISO 12100, Figure 3, ISO, Geneva, 2010.
[2] “Risk Perception”, Wikipedia, accessed 19/​20-​​May-​​2011, http://​en​.wikipedia​.org/​w​i​k​i​/​R​i​s​k​_​p​e​r​c​e​p​t​ion.
[3] Chancey Starr, “Social Benefits ver­sus Technological Risks”, Science Vol. 165, No. 3899. (Sep. 19, 1969), pp. 1232–1238
[4] Paul Slovic, Baruch Fischhoff, Sarah Lichtenstein, “Why Study Risk Perception?”, Risk Analysis 2(2) (1982), pp. 83–93.

CSA Z1002 Public Review — Last Day!

Last Chance!

Today is Thursday, 17-​​Mar-​​2011, mark­ing 60 days into the pub­lic review period for CSA Z1002Occupational Health and Safety Hazard Identification and Elimination and Risk Assessment and Control.

If you down­loaded the draft from the CSA web site, remem­ber that the PDF will lock on 18-​​Mar, and you will no longer be able to do any­thing with it. If you haven’t looked at it yet, NOW IS THE TIME! Comments must also be sub­mit­ted by mid­night on the 17th, so please sub­mit them as soon as pos­si­ble. No sub­mis­sions will be accepted after the 17th of March!

If you don’t have the draft already, get it here. Comments can be sub­mit­ted in the same place as you down­load the draft. DO NOT SUBMIT COMMENTS TO THIS BLOG.

If you need more infor­ma­tion on the draft or on sub­mis­sion of com­ments, please con­tact the CSA Project Manager, Ms. Elizabeth Rankin, elizabeth.rankin’at’csa.ca  (eliz­a­bethdotrankinatcsadotca)  , +1 (416) 747‑2011.

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