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	<title>Machinery Safety 101</title>
	<atom:link href="http://machinerysafety101.com/feed/" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" />
	<link>http://machinerysafety101.com</link>
	<description>Safe designs for safe workplaces</description>
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		<item>
		<title>The Third Level of the Hierarchy: Information for Use</title>
		<link>http://machinerysafety101.com/2012/01/16/the-third-level-of-the-hierarchy-information-for-use/</link>
		<comments>http://machinerysafety101.com/2012/01/16/the-third-level-of-the-hierarchy-information-for-use/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Mon, 16 Jan 2012 21:06:56 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Doug Nix</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Information for Use]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Standards]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[2006/42/EC]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Canada]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[CE Mark]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[CSA Z432]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Hierarchy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Product Liability]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[USA]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://machinerysafety101.com/?p=1458</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[I’ve written about the Hierarchy of Controls in past posts, but I’ve focused on the ‘engineering’ side of the control equation: Physical changes to machine design to eliminate hazards, and mechanical or electrical control systems that can reduce risk. The &#8230;<p class="read-more"><a href="http://machinerysafety101.com/2012/01/16/the-third-level-of-the-hierarchy-information-for-use/">Read more &#187;</a></p>]]></description>
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		<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
	
		<series:name><![CDATA[Hierarchy of Controls]]></series:name>
	</item>
		<item>
		<title>31-Dec-2011 — Are YOU ready?</title>
		<link>http://machinerysafety101.com/2011/12/30/31-dec-2011-are-you-ready/</link>
		<comments>http://machinerysafety101.com/2011/12/30/31-dec-2011-are-you-ready/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Fri, 30 Dec 2011 17:59:20 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Doug Nix</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Control Functions]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Control Reliability]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[EU European Union]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Functional Safety]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[International]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[ISO 13849]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Standards]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[controls reliability 13849 machinery  interlock]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[EN 954-1]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[EN ISO 13849-1]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[IEC 62061]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[ISO 13849-1]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://machinerysafety101.com/?p=1446</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[31-December-2011 marks a key milestone for machine builders marketing their products in the European Union, the EEA and many of the Candidate States. Functional Safety takes a positive step forward with the mandatory application of EN ISO 13849–1 and –2. &#8230;<p class="read-more"><a href="http://machinerysafety101.com/2011/12/30/31-dec-2011-are-you-ready/">Read more &#187;</a></p>]]></description>
		<wfw:commentRss>http://machinerysafety101.com/2011/12/30/31-dec-2011-are-you-ready/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
		<slash:comments>2</slash:comments>
	
		<series:name><![CDATA[Circuit Architectures Explored]]></series:name>
	</item>
		<item>
		<title>Why I wear a Poppy on 11-Nov</title>
		<link>http://machinerysafety101.com/2011/11/11/why-i-wear-a-poppy-on-11-nov/</link>
		<comments>http://machinerysafety101.com/2011/11/11/why-i-wear-a-poppy-on-11-nov/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Fri, 11 Nov 2011 13:44:13 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Doug Nix</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Canada]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[International]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[USA]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://machinerysafety101.com/?p=1434</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[In a recent article in the Independent, Robert Fisk writes that the poppy has become nothing more than a fashion statement in the UK. Merely a way to show that you are British, or to score points with the boss, &#8230;<p class="read-more"><a href="http://machinerysafety101.com/2011/11/11/why-i-wear-a-poppy-on-11-nov/">Read more &#187;</a></p>]]></description>
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		<slash:comments>3</slash:comments>
		</item>
		<item>
		<title>Inconsistencies in ISO 13849–1:2006</title>
		<link>http://machinerysafety101.com/2011/11/10/inconsistencies-in-iso-13849-12006/</link>
		<comments>http://machinerysafety101.com/2011/11/10/inconsistencies-in-iso-13849-12006/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Thu, 10 Nov 2011 13:30:02 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Doug Nix</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Control Functions]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Control Reliability]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Functional Safety]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[International]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[ISO 13849]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Standards]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[2006/42/EC]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[controls reliability 13849 machinery  interlock]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[EN ISO 13849-1]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://machinerysafety101.com/?p=1425</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[I’ve written quite a bit recently on the topic of circuit architectures under ISO 13849–1, and one of my readers noticed an inconsistency between the text of the standard and Figure 5, the diagram that shows how the categories can &#8230;<p class="read-more"><a href="http://machinerysafety101.com/2011/11/10/inconsistencies-in-iso-13849-12006/">Read more &#187;</a></p>]]></description>
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		<slash:comments>1</slash:comments>
	
		<series:name><![CDATA[Circuit Architectures Explored]]></series:name>
	</item>
		<item>
		<title>Bye, Steve. Thanks for everything!</title>
		<link>http://machinerysafety101.com/2011/10/06/bye-steve/</link>
		<comments>http://machinerysafety101.com/2011/10/06/bye-steve/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Thu, 06 Oct 2011 14:07:20 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Doug Nix</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://machinerysafety101.com/?p=1418</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Today marks a turning point for me. With the loss of Steve Jobs, the world is a lesser place. His brilliance, vision and charisma changed the world for the better in so many ways. As anyone who knows me well &#8230;<p class="read-more"><a href="http://machinerysafety101.com/2011/10/06/bye-steve/">Read more &#187;</a></p>]]></description>
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		<slash:comments>3</slash:comments>
		</item>
		<item>
		<title>Standards in Music</title>
		<link>http://machinerysafety101.com/2011/10/05/standards-in-music/</link>
		<comments>http://machinerysafety101.com/2011/10/05/standards-in-music/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Wed, 05 Oct 2011 12:30:37 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Doug Nix</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Standards]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://machinerysafety101.com/?p=1411</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Working in a field that is standards heavy, I often get questions from clients and students about the origin of standards. Recently I heard a discussion on CBC radio talking about the origins of musical notation, and I realized that &#8230;<p class="read-more"><a href="http://machinerysafety101.com/2011/10/05/standards-in-music/">Read more &#187;</a></p>]]></description>
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		<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
		</item>
		<item>
		<title>Interlock Architectures Pt. 6 — Comparing North American and International Systems</title>
		<link>http://machinerysafety101.com/2011/10/03/interlock-architectures-pt-6-comparing-north-american-and-international-systems/</link>
		<comments>http://machinerysafety101.com/2011/10/03/interlock-architectures-pt-6-comparing-north-american-and-international-systems/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Mon, 03 Oct 2011 12:30:09 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Doug Nix</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Control Functions]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Control Reliability]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[EU European Union]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Functional Safety]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[International]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[ISO 13849]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[North American Robotics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Robotics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Standards]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[controls reliability 13849 machinery  interlock]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[CSA Z432]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[EN 954-1]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[EN ISO 13849-1]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://machinerysafety101.com/?p=1368</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[I’ve now written six posts, including this one, on the topic of circuit architectures for the safety–related parts of control systems. In this post, we’ll compare the International and North American systems. This comparison is not intended to draw conclusions &#8230;<p class="read-more"><a href="http://machinerysafety101.com/2011/10/03/interlock-architectures-pt-6-comparing-north-american-and-international-systems/">Read more &#187;</a></p>]]></description>
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		<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
	
		<series:name><![CDATA[Circuit Architectures Explored]]></series:name>
	</item>
		<item>
		<title>How Risk Assessment Fails—Again. This time at DuPont.</title>
		<link>http://machinerysafety101.com/2011/09/27/how-risk-assessment-fails%e2%80%94again-this-time-at-dupont/</link>
		<comments>http://machinerysafety101.com/2011/09/27/how-risk-assessment-fails%e2%80%94again-this-time-at-dupont/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Tue, 27 Sep 2011 14:43:12 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Doug Nix</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Risk Assessment]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[risk]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://machinerysafety101.com/?p=1377</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[A recent report released by the US Chemical Safety Board (CSB) looks at a series of accidents that occurred over a 33-hour period on January 22 and 23, 2010 at the DuPont Corporation’s Belle, West Virginia, chemical manufacturing plant. A number &#8230;<p class="read-more"><a href="http://machinerysafety101.com/2011/09/27/how-risk-assessment-fails%e2%80%94again-this-time-at-dupont/">Read more &#187;</a></p>]]></description>
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		<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
	
		<series:name><![CDATA[Risk Assessment]]></series:name>
	</item>
		<item>
		<title>Interlock Architectures – Pt. 5: Category 4 — Control Reliable</title>
		<link>http://machinerysafety101.com/2011/09/26/interlock-architectures-%e2%80%93-pt-5-category-4/</link>
		<comments>http://machinerysafety101.com/2011/09/26/interlock-architectures-%e2%80%93-pt-5-category-4/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Mon, 26 Sep 2011 12:30:41 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Doug Nix</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Control Functions]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Control Reliability]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Emergency Stop]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Functional Safety]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Guards and Guarding]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Interlocks]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[controls reliability 13849 machinery  interlock]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[CSA Z432]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[EMC]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[EN 954-1]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[EN ISO 13849-1]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[ISO 13849-1]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://machinerysafety101.com/?p=194</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[The most reliable of the five system architectures, Category 4 is the only architecture that uses multiple-fault tolerant techniques to help ensure that component failures do not result in an unacceptable exposure to risk. This post will delve into the &#8230;<p class="read-more"><a href="http://machinerysafety101.com/2011/09/26/interlock-architectures-%e2%80%93-pt-5-category-4/">Read more &#187;</a></p>]]></description>
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		<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
	
		<series:name><![CDATA[Circuit Architectures Explored]]></series:name>
	</item>
		<item>
		<title>What did TEPCO know about Fukushima before 11-Mar-11?</title>
		<link>http://machinerysafety101.com/2011/09/22/what-did-tepco-know-about-fukushima-before-11-mar-11/</link>
		<comments>http://machinerysafety101.com/2011/09/22/what-did-tepco-know-about-fukushima-before-11-mar-11/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Thu, 22 Sep 2011 14:31:05 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Doug Nix</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Risk Assessment]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://machinerysafety101.com/?p=1357</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[I recently had a colleague point out an interesting paper published in the “Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists” about the level of knowledge that existed between the start of construction of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant and the devastating tsunami &#8230;<p class="read-more"><a href="http://machinerysafety101.com/2011/09/22/what-did-tepco-know-about-fukushima-before-11-mar-11/">Read more &#187;</a></p>]]></description>
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		<slash:comments>2</slash:comments>
	
		<series:name><![CDATA[Risk Assessment]]></series:name>
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