Machinery Safety 101

How to do a 13849 – 1 analysis: Complete Reference List

This entry is part 8 of 9 in the series How to do a 13849 – 1 ana­lys­is

Post updated 2019-07-24. Ed. As prom­ised in pre­vi­ous posts, here is the com­plete ref­er­ence list for the series “How to do a 13849 – 1 ana­lys­is”! If you have any addi­tion­al resources you think read­ers would find help­ful, please add them in the com­ments. Copy­right secured by Digi­prove © 2017 – 2018Acknow­ledge­ments: As cited.Some Rights ReservedOri­gin­al con­tent here is pub­lished under these license terms: X License Type:Non-com­mer­cial, Attri­bu­tion,…

ISO 13849 – 1 Analysis — Part 8: Fault Exclusion

This entry is part 9 of 9 in the series How to do a 13849 – 1 ana­lys­is

Post updated 2019-07-24. Ed. Fault Con­sid­er­a­tion & Fault Exclu­sion ISO 13849 – 1, Chapter 7 [1, 7] dis­cusses the need for fault con­sid­er­a­tion and fault exclu­sion. Fault con­sid­er­a­tion is the pro­cess of examin­ing the com­pon­ents and sub-sys­tems used in the safety-related part of the con­trol sys­tem (SRP/CS) and mak­ing a list of all the faults that could occur in each…

ISO 13849 – 1 Analysis — Part 7: Safety-Related Software

General architecture model of software
This entry is part 7 of 9 in the series How to do a 13849 – 1 ana­lys­is

Post updated 2019-07-24. Ed. Safety-Related Soft­ware Up to this point, I have been dis­cuss­ing the basic pro­cesses used for the design of safety-related parts of con­trol sys­tems. The under­ly­ing assump­tion is that these tech­niques apply to the design of hard­ware used for safety pur­poses. The remain­ing ques­tion focuses on the design and devel­op­ment of safety-related soft­ware…

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ISO 13849 – 1 Analysis — Part 6: CCF — Common Cause Failures

This entry is part 6 of 9 in the series How to do a 13849 – 1 ana­lys­is

Post updated 2019-07-24. Ed. What is a “Com­mon Cause Fail­ure”? There are two sim­il­ar-sound­ing terms that people often get con­fused: Com­mon Cause Fail­ure (CCF) and Com­mon Mode Fail­ure. While these two types of fail­ures sound sim­il­ar, they are dif­fer­ent. A Com­mon Cause Fail­ure is a fail­ure in a sys­tem where two or more por­tions of the sys­tem fail at…

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Get the Basics Right!

For more than 15 years I’ve been teach­ing people about risk assess­ment, machinery safety and CE Mark­ing of machinery in private, onsite classes and through present­a­tions at safety con­fer­ences. Things are about to change! This fall, Com­pli­ance InSight Con­sult­ing will begin offer­ing open-enrol­­ment work­shops in CE Mark­ing, Risk Assess­ment Func­tion­al Safety, and Machinery Safety, all with a focus…

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31-Dec-2011 – Are YOU ready?

This entry is part 8 of 8 in the series Cir­cuit Archi­tec­tures Explored

31-Decem­ber-2011 marks a key mile­stone for machine build­ers mar­ket­ing their products in the European Uni­on, the EEA and many of the Can­did­ate States. Func­tion­al Safety takes a pos­it­ive step for­ward with the man­dat­ory applic­a­tion of EN ISO 13849 – 1 and ‑2. As of 1‑Janu­ary-2012, the safety-related parts of the con­trol sys­tems on all machinery bear­ing a CE Mark will be…

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Inconsistencies in ISO 13849 – 1:2006

This entry is part 7 of 8 in the series Cir­cuit Archi­tec­tures Explored

I’ve writ­ten quite a bit recently on the top­ic of cir­cuit archi­tec­tures under ISO 13849 – 1, and one of my read­ers noticed an incon­sist­ency between the text of the stand­ard and Fig­ure 5, the dia­gram that shows how the cat­egor­ies can span one or more Per­form­ance Levels. If you look at Cat­egory 2 in Fig­ure 5, you will notice…

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Interlock Architectures Pt. 6 – Comparing North American and International Systems

industrial Control Console
This entry is part 6 of 8 in the series Cir­cuit Archi­tec­tures Explored

I’ve now writ­ten six posts, includ­ing this one, on the top­ic of cir­cuit archi­tec­tures for the safety-related parts of con­trol sys­tems. In this post, we’ll com­pare the Inter­na­tion­al and North Amer­ic­an sys­tems. This com­par­is­on is not inten­ded to draw con­clu­sions about which is “bet­ter”, but rather to com­pare and con­trast the two sys­tems so that…

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Interlock Architectures – Pt. 5: Category 4 — Control Reliable

This entry is part 5 of 8 in the series Cir­cuit Archi­tec­tures Explored

Ed. note: I’ve made a few updates to this art­icle since it was first pub­lished in 2011, with the most recent today, 6‑Dec-18. – DN – The most reli­able of the five sys­tem archi­tec­tures, Cat­egory 4 is the only archi­tec­ture that uses mul­­tiple-fault tol­er­ant tech­niques to help ensure that com­pon­ent fail­ures do not res­ult in an unac­cept­able…

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Interlock Architectures – Pt. 4: Category 3 – Control Reliable

Category 3 Architecture Logic Block Diagram
This entry is part 4 of 8 in the series Cir­cuit Archi­tec­tures Explored

Cat­egory 3 sys­tem archi­tec­ture is the first cat­egory that could be con­sidered to have sim­il­ar­ity to “Con­trol Reli­able” cir­cuits or sys­tems as defined in the North Amer­ic­an stand­ards. It is not the same as Con­trol Reli­able, but we’ll get to in a sub­sequent post. If you haven’t read the first three posts in this series, you may…

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